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Case C-593/18 P, ABB Ltd. and ABB AB v. European Commission, EU:C:2019:1027 
On November 28, 2019, the Seventh Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union partially annulled Commission Decision of April 2, 2014, which established an 
infringement and imposed fines on undertakings involved in the power cables cartel, as 
far as it concerns ABB Ltd. and ABB AB. The Commission committed an error of law by 
presuming that the scope of a cartel agreement could be extended to products for 
which no clear evidence existed of them being covered by the cartel. 
 
The Power Cables Cartel in a Nutshell 
Power cables play an important role in the transmission and distribution of electricity. 
They can be placed underground or under water (submarine cables) and are either low 
voltage, medium voltage or high/extra high voltage.2 Although sold as separate 
products, power cables in practice are offered as part of a bigger “project,” which 
includes the cable itself, its installation, accessories, and (maintenance) services.3 That 
is also the case for high/extra-high voltage cables.4 Acting on the basis of an application 
for immunity introduced by ABB, the European Commission opened proceedings against 
a number of undertakings involved in the offering of such high/extra-high voltage power 
cable projects. The investigation,5 which resulted in the Infringement Decision of April 
2, 2014, brought to light that various undertakings had conspired to allocate projects 
and refrain from competing directly with each other. More particularly, the Commission 
found that the allocation agreements related to “all types of underground power cables 
with a voltage of 110 kV and above and all types of submarine power cables with a 
voltage of 33 kV and above, including all products, works and services supplied to 
customers in connection with a sale of power cables, when such sales were part of a 
power cable project.”6 
For having restricted competition in relation to those products, the various 
undertakings were imposed fines totaling 301,6 million euros. ABB, which as a 
successful leniency applicant obtained immunity, was not imposed a fine.7 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly at first sight, ABB nevertheless introduced an action for 
annulment against the Commission Decision.8 It essentially argued that the Commission 
had committed errors of law in defining the products covered by the cartel and as 
regards the duration of ABB’s involvement in the cartel. As to the products, ABB held 
that the Commission Decision covered all projects involving underground power cables 
with voltages of 110 kV and above (and not only projects involving underground power 
cables with voltages of 220 kV and above), whereas ABB argued that the products with 
voltages above 110 kV and below 220 kV were not part of the cartel agreement.9 At the 
hearing, ABB rightfully observed that “a lack of precision in the determination of the 
products or the duration of participation could have significant consequences in the 
context of actions for damages brought before national courts, which they claim are 
connected to the Commission’s decision.”10 If accepted, ABB could be held civilly liable 
for an infringement on the basis of the Commission Decision that was established on 




The Appeal in the Case at Hand 
As mentioned above, ABB’s action for annulment focused on the errors of law in defining 
the relevant product and timeframes of the cartel. Although the General Court initially 
rejected those grounds, the Court of Justice upheld the claim that the Commission had 
made an error of law by providing a sufficiently inaccurate definition of the relevant 
products involved in the cartel agreement. We will focus our analysis on that particular 
point. 
ABB had argued that the Commission incorrectly inferred from a series of documents 
that the cartel agreement extended to products from 110 kV and below 220 kV and, in 
doing so, it had failed to discharge its burden of proof. The General Court, however, 
disagreed with that argument. It referred to a General Court precedent stating that it 
is “necessary to take account of the fact that anticompetitive activities take place 
clandestinely, that meetings are held in secret, that the associated documentation is 
reduced to a minimum, that the documents discovered by the Commission are normally 
only fragmentary and sparse, and accordingly, in most cases, the existence of an 
anticompetitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences 
and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible 
explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules.”11 On top 
of that, “to determine the products covered by a cartel, the Commission is not required 
to define the relevant market on the basis of economic criteria. It is the members of 
the cartel themselves who determine the products which are the subject of their 
discussions and concerted practices.”12 Applying that case law to the case at hand, the 
General Court came to the conclusion that the Commission had relied on sufficient 
evidentiary materials to substantiate its claim.13 
The Court of Justice disagreed with that analysis and argued that the General Court 
had committed an error of law in misapplying the rules relating to the burden of proof 
imposed on the Commission. According to the Court of Justice, “it should be borne in 
mind that, according to the case law of the Court of Justice, in the field of competition 
law, where there is a dispute as to the existence of an infringement, it is for the 
Commission to prove the infringements found by it and to adduce evidence capable of 
demonstrating to the requisite legal standard the existence of the circumstances 
constituting an infringement.”14 That principle implies that the Commission has to 
prove the existence or extension of the cartel agreement to the particular products 
concerned. 
In this case, however, the General Court based its finding, that aspects of the 
infringement at hand covered power cable accessories for underground power cable 
projects with voltages from 110 kV and below 220 kV, on a recital in the Commission 
decision which stated that most projects related to underground or submarine power 
cables were of a global nature, including cables, accessories, and related services. By 
principally referring to that condition, the General Court “did not adduce any concrete 
evidence to support the claim that the collective refusal to supply power cable 
accessories covered accessories for underground power cables with voltages from 
110 kV and below 220 kV.”15 
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Since the Commission’s decisions contained no hard evidence to back up that 
conclusion, the Court of Justice had no choice but to arrive at the conclusion, while 
rendering a final judgment on the matter, that the “evidence is capable of raising 
doubts as to whether the collective refusal to supply power cable accessories covered 
accessories for underground power cables with voltages from 110 kV and below 
220 kV.”16 According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, “having regard to the 
presumption of innocence which applies to procedures relating to infringements of the 
competition rules that may result in the imposition of fines or periodic penalty 
payments, the benefit of any doubt must be given to the undertaking to which the 
decision finding an infringement was addressed.”17 As a result, the Commission was 
considered to have failed in meeting the requisite standard of proof, resulting in the 
Commission Decision being annulled on that particular point.18 
 
The Court limits the Commission’s reliance on evidentiary shortcuts under Article 
101(1) TFEU 
The ABB judgment confirms that the Commission cannot simply infer that a restrictive 
agreement extends to another category of power cables projects on the basis that most 
projects in that category are of a similar global nature as the projects for which clear 
documentary evidence is available. It thereby overruled General Court precedents 
claiming that the clear definition of the products covered by the cartel agreement was 
not necessary. 
In doing so, the judgment reconfirms the standard of proof underlying Article 101(1) 
TFEU and the burden placed upon the Commission to make a persuasive argument that 
this standard has been reached. In addition, the Court also raises questions as to the 
continued relevance of evidentiary shortcuts, both in the context of the enforcement 
of Article 101(1) TFEU and within the framework of EU antitrust law in general. 
The Court reconfirms the Commission’s standard and burden of proof when enforcing 
Article 101(1) TFEU 
In its judgment, the Court held that the required standard to prove the existence of a 
restrictive agreement in terms of products covered had not been met. In doing so, the 
Court showed the interrelatedness between standard and burden of proof in the 
enforcement of Article 101 TFEU. As Advocate General Kokott eloquently summarized 
in her Opinion to the T-Mobile judgment, 
The standard of proof determines the requirements which must be 
satisfied for facts to be regarded as proven. It must be distinguished from 
the burden of proof. The burden of proof determines, first, which party 
must put forward the facts and, where necessary, adduce the related 
evidence ([…] also known as the evidential burden); second, the allocation 
of that burden determines which party bears the risk of facts remaining 
unresolved or allegations unproven […].19 
The standard of proof requires the Commission to offer elements allowing direct 
assessment and understanding of the products included in the restrictive agreement or 
practice covered by Article 101 TFEU. Per Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003, it is the 
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Commission which has to bring such evidence, bearing the burden of offering 
sufficiently persuading evidence as to the existence of a restrictive practice. The 
Commission thus bears the burden of showing the standard of proof is met. 
The Court’s judgment in this case confirmed20 that, in order to meet the standard of 
proof, the Commission had to show by means of sufficiently concrete direct evidence – 
and not by way of inferences – that a particular product category was covered by the 
restrictive agreement or practice. From that point of view, the judgment is not 
surprising. EU Courts have held on previous occasions that the Commission cannot 
accept certain conclusions in an unsubstantiated way, implicitly shifting the burden to 
rebut those conclusions on to the undertakings concerned.21 This case confirmed that 
the basic principle of the Commission having to bring the evidence also applies to the 
determination of the material scope of an Article 101 TFEU infringement. If the 
Commission fails to prove that element, the risk of the issue remaining unresolved lies 
exclusively with the Commission when establishing the material scope of the cartel 
agreement is at stake. 
The Commission cannot rely on evidentiary shortcuts when determining the material 
scope of a restrictive practice under Article 101(1) TFEU 
The Court’s confirmation of the principles regarding standard and burden of proof in 
EU competition law is not surprising. What is remarkable, however, is the Court’s 
apparent or implicit reluctance to further promote the Commission’s use of evidentiary 
shortcuts. 
In general terms, an evidentiary shortcut would “enable enforcement authorities or 
private claimants to apply a prohibition rule, without having to make a conclusive 
argument that the behavior at stake indeed presented anticompetitive effects. 
Applying those [shortcuts], enforcement authorities and courts can effectively assume 
a specific kind of behavior to be in place and act as if it was in place.”22 When such a 
shortcut is applied, it will subsequently fall upon the undertakings, which mostly have 
the evidence to prove the contrary more readily at their disposal23, to counter the 
assumptions on which the shortcut evidentiary rules operate. Evidentiary shortcuts 
continue to be relied on elsewhere in the framework of Article 101 TFEU. Although 
neither Article 101 nor Regulation 1/2003 contain any references whatsoever to such 
shortcuts, the Court of Justice has allowed the Commission to rely on them in at least 
three circumstances related to Article 101(1) TFEU: (1) to presume that contacts 
between undertakings have caused ensuing coordination and, therefore, potentially 
anticompetitive behavior,24 and (2) to presume that a parent company exercised 
decisive influence over the potentially anticompetitive decisions made by its 
subsidiary.25 In each of those two scenarios, it is sufficient for the Commission to 
highlight the presence of certain elements (contacts between undertakings, a 
relationship of (full) control or ownership) to arrive at a legal conclusion (the existence 







In the case at hand, the Court did not recognize, as a matter of EU law, a similar 
evidentiary shortcut allowing the extension of the material scope of the products 
involved in a particular cartel agreement. As one is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty, it falls solely upon the Commission to determine the scope of the cartel 
agreement it seeks to end. From that perspective, the case shows above all that the 
Court is hesitant to extend the Commission’s reliance on evidentiary shortcuts. In doing 
so, the Court seems to go in a similar direction as it did in other cases, requiring the 
Commission to prove all relevant elements instead of requiring undertakings to offer 
negative proof that they did not engage in a particular behavior.26 In doing so, the Court 
seemingly also attaches ever-increasing importance to the presumption of innocence in 
the context of the Commission’s enforcement proceedings, and uses that fundamental 
right to limit the Commission’s evidentiary shortcut approach. 
On a more general level, however, the Court also implicitly calls into question the 
continuing relevance of evidentiary shortcuts in the overall EU antitrust enforcement 
system. If the presumption of innocence is to be taken (more) seriously as a 
fundamental right, chances are this may have further impact upon existing evidentiary 
shortcuts already in place in EU competition law. 
At first sight, the ABB judgment could be understood to indicate that those existing 
shortcuts may, at some point, also be called into question.27 That point should not be 
exaggerated, however. The judgment analyzed here was not rendered by the Grand 
Chamber, and only touched upon an evidentiary presumption that had never before 
been validated by the Court of Justice. Not recognizing this evidentiary shortcut does 
not imply the end of all similar shortcuts recognized in case law. What the judgment 
does make clear, however, is that the Court seems unwilling to recognize other 
evidentiary shortcuts that would make the life of the European Commission easier. It is 
interesting to note in that respect that the European Commission, or at least 
Competition Commissioner Vestager,28 seems to be pleading for a swifter reversal of 
the burden of proof in cases concerning digital markets.29 If the Court decides to limit 
the reliance on evidentiary shortcuts, legitimate questions may be raised as to whether 
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